The best legal theory for ostensibly defrauded persons conflicts with the State Bar’s approach to my case, but the State Bar’s infectious routinism infiltrates the general practice of law, depositing a vast gangrenous layer of ineptitude. Accordingly, the incompetent State Bar agrees with some inept lawyers in accepting the settlement agreement's lawfulness, despite Kim’s transgressions. Such incompetent lawyers work in symbiosis with the State Bar to obfuscate their failure to represent their clients.
Properly serving these defrauded persons’ interests requires a slightly creative application of the law of agency. The legal theory is that the insurer’s right and duty to send payments to my office depends on the existence of an attorney-client relationship between me and the insured, and the lack of such relationship gives defrauded persons the right to rescind their settlement agreement. Since no lawyer represented defrauded persons, one of the conditions precedent implied by law into the settlement agreement fails. It fails because an unlawful contract is void, as is the underpinning legal services contract between office manager Kim and defrauded persons. Because of extrinsic fraud, defrauded persons didn’t get a fair shot at negotiating their damages. Defrauded-persons’ attorneys could have placed the burden of financial loss on the insurance company.
In the case of a defrauded persons’ attorney, Scott A. Meyers, Esq., both self-interest and incompetence drove his failure to advance his clients’ interests. Meyers represents two distinct ostensibly defrauded persons, the first, personal injury claimants, and the second, a chiropractor claiming a lien on a defrauded person’s settlement. If Meyers had proceeded on the voided-settlement legal theory, his chiropractor could state no present claim, since a contingent-payment agreement governed the chiropractor's remuneration. This conflict between the clients is not the end of Meyers's misconduct. Lawyers lack patience for delaying recovery until some subsequent attorney of record can reap the reward, occasioning a second conflict of interest, this time between the personal injury claimants and Meyers personally.
How often do lawyers of Meyers’s ilk sabotage their clients’ interests, even without Meyers’s conflict of interest? The State Bar doctrinal line, in which accused lawyers must couch their mitigating remorse, is strict ethical liability for the acts of one’s staff, implying formation of an attorney-client contract despite subterfuge. Many lawyers without Meyers's corrupt tendencies will embrace this line, by osmosis and from wariness to undermine their own remorseful expressions, should their error or the State Bar’s caprice require.
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