My case tests the Supreme Court's response in a State Bar disbarment matter when following the law conflicts with the Supreme Court's political interests. More than a test, the case has been an experiment, unethical except for the self-represented and, for those, universally deemed unwise by legally educated opinion. Pushing the procedural limits to guarantee an informative outcome, I compelled the Supreme Court to choose between approving a felony under color of law and, despite the State Bar Court's function as as the Supreme Court's administrative arm, becoming the vehicle for a State Bar scandal.
I conjectured the Supreme Court wouldn't accept the case's gross improprieties, but the disbarment order of September 10, 2008, refuted my conjecture. The outcome, nontheless, allows assessing Supreme Court review of State Bar matters. The State Bar Court does not, in any sense, function as a court because its overseer, the California Supreme Court, decides petitions for writs of review politically.
Here, the State Bar failed to serve its answer to my petition for writ of review. I moved to strike the unserved answer. The State Bar, while opposing my motion to strike, conceded improper service by not mentioning it and not explaining why the Bar twice failed to serve me properly. The State Bar didn't serve me even after my motion informed the Bar its service had miscarried. The State Bar, seemingly, preferred I not reply to its opposition. The Bar got wishes fulfilled when the Supreme Court denied the motion to strike and denied the petition for writ of review.
Blunders by the State Bar have consistently helped me establish key points, although once established, arguing from them has proven futile. When the case was before the Hearing Department, the prosecutrix's theft of documents allowed me to attack the State Bar's unjudicial practices, taking forms needing no proof for their classification. Yet, the Hearing Judge refused to make any findings. In the case before the Supreme Court, the State Bar demonstrated reckless disregard for a respondent's proper service. Yet the Supreme Court not only refrained from striking the motion, it did not even direct proper service, to allow for a reply. If the court could argue that I did not ask for alternative remedies, it cannot justify basing rulings on documents opposing counsel prevented me from seeing. The repeated occurrence of State Bar blunders and their lack of practical significance are related. The State Bar, having learned its mistakes are inconsequential, has lost even its ability to recognize them.
I will explore, in a subsequent Installment, why the State Bar Court appeared to function in a minimally judicial fashion, even though it really is no court at all. Deserving early mention and requiring revision are some of my suggestions for State Bar defense. I do not now think it possible to win by showing the Supreme Court that the State Bar Court lacks basic procedural integrity. When the State Bar's foundational practices are attacked with allegations that would impugn the State Bar Court's legitimacy, the Supreme Court will deny the petition for writ of review.
I'll continue discussing the implications of the nonjudicial character of the State Bar Court next Installment. Other than this series of final case-relevant Installments, kanBARoo Court's coverage of my case is complete, but kanBARoo Court — the only web site or blog dedicated to State Bar-law analysis (not reportage and journalistic commentary) — will continue its treatment of State Bar oppression.