98th Installment. The California State Bar seeks new oppressive pleading allowances—and the defense bar pretends to object

The official California State Bar “defense bar” bemoans the recently proposed formal curtailments of respondents’ right to explicit prosecutorial pleading, but in practice the bar court long ago abandoned its formal pleading rules. (State Bar Rules of Procedure, rules 101(b)(2) & (3).)  The defense establishment doesn't know because for years the official bar-defense attorneys have allowed prosecutors license in their vague charging allegations. Let any State Bar defense attorney name a case where they filed a motion to dismiss because the allegations failed by standards the Supreme Court repeatedly demanded that pleadings disclose not just the violated rule and the violating conduct but the manner in which the conduct violates the rule. (See Baker v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 804 and predecessor cases.)

The bar court effectively repealed the pleading requirements because the bar-defense establishment had ceased raising them after the California Supreme Court tired of repeating itself and then drifted to authoritarianism. Granting prosecutors license has become part of the defense establishment’s grand bargain: preferential treatment for not rocking the boat. Because of its inexperience with real cases—those made real by challenging the State Bar’s central allegations rather than quibbling for a better bargain—the defense bar can’t even say what’s wrong with the expansion of the state bar’s pleading powers. The State Bar’s Chief Trial Attorney argues that it can restrict the rights of respondents to the bare necessities of notice pleading as practiced in criminal law, and the defense bar responds that this exemplifies the trend toward fewer respondent rights: “Brick by brick, procedural protections for  respondents in the discipline system are being dismantled.” But noticing a trend doesn't even rise to the level of counter-argument; it may even help justify. Noting a trend is the best the defense bar can do when it tries to muster an argument: no wonder it never dared argue for dismissal based on inadequate pleading!

Yet the argument that the new pleading rules are oppressive and illegal is straightforward. The Notice of Disciplinary Charges differs from criminal charges in the crucial respect that the answering party must affirm or deny each of the facts the State Bar pleads. The NDC isn’t just a pleading tool; it rolls pleading and discovery functions into one procedure. To require no connection between fact and charge violates respondents’ right to privacy under the California constitution by inviting arbitrary fishing expeditions. Even more importantly, to require answers to loaded questions, a State Bar norm, violates due process.                                

Interlude 25. California Supreme Court weighs in for state-bar extremists: Time to turn to the federal courts

The California Supreme Court has taken the unprecedented step of returning 24 cases for harsher discipline. The Supreme Court would exceed its jurisdiction by expressly demanding an outcome, so it must order the bar court to “reconsider” the discipline or itself impose the harsher sentence. But the Supreme Court’s terse message was clear for all who could read, for two reasons: the Supreme Court cited the infamous Silverton decision; and most tellingly, the Supreme Court returned no cases in which the Bar Court had recommended disbarment. The Supreme Court wasn’t interested in reversing disbarments; it wanted a greater number.

Why didn’t the Supreme Court impose the disbarments itself? This way, it sent a clear message to the State Bar: we want you to do the dirty work; that’s the reason you exist! The State Bar immediately took the hint by petitioning to recall 24 additional cases, despite the patent illegality of this move. (State Bar Court Rules of Procedure, Rule 807(b)(2).) The one-sidedness of the Supreme Court’s intervention—tacitly urging greater harshness rather than justice—reassured the State Bar the Supreme Court would let it run untrammeled.

Only the patsies in the state-bar defense establishment contrived to construe the Supreme Court’s message as ambiguous. The state-bar-court system is their playground and their livelihood. Never do official bar-defense attorneys appeal to the federal courts. That would violate their silent contract with the Office of Chief Trial Counsel.

California lawyers should take the Supreme Court’s order—especially its omissions—as an official announcement that it will overlook unjust prosecutions and excessive verdicts. If there is any legal remedy for unjust treatment by the California State Bar, it lies in the federal courts—where official bar-defense counsel will never tread.

Interlude 11: Drexel and the DAs

Chief Trial Counsel Scott J. Drexel's removal has so demoralized the California State Bar bureaucracy that its trial counsel have succumbed to temptation to do the unthinkable: debate a former respondent. The discussion was at Crime and Federalism, a proprosecutorial blog, which bemoaned Drexel's firing. To start toward the end with comments by a current state-bar respondent, an elderly and disabled attorney, who describes his ordeal before the State Bar:

Unless you have experienced the tactics used by the State Bar, you cannot appreciate the Mike Nifong mentality that permeates the process from start to finish. I know enough from experience the Drexel marching order is a "take no prisoners" operation that justifies its inquisition by parroting "We're protecting the public." Anybody critical of Scott Drexel must be opposed to protecting the public. Right? Drexel's M.O. has been to squander millions in building an empire devoted to destroying the sole practitioner, preferably elderly and disabled,while the big firm lawyers only find their licenses lifted due to federal court convictions. Do not believe the State Bar prosecution press releases as they are strictly public relation promotions like the above.

Attorney William Wells later added:

Further to the Scott Drexel playbook. During a continued trial I sufferred multiple fractures from a fall that required surgical repairs, hospitalization and bed confinement so I obtained a Declaration from a physician aware of these facts and filed it with a motion to continue in the routine manner in such events. Unknown to me, the Deputy trial counsel Erin M. Joyce secretly issued a subpoena for the personal appearance in court of my physcian over a two week span and caused a week of stalking, trespassing and harassment by a State Bar Investigator of my physcian at his home, office and hospital. Despite no personal service, Erin Joyce, trial counsel, caused to be prepared a false Declaration of personal service that only surfaced when a Motion to Quash was filed by my physcian and disclosed that the Declaration of Service was on its face totally illegal. The court agreed and granted the Motion to Quash but no sanctions or attorney fees and no redress by a tort action for abuse of process. If I need a Declaration from my physcian what would be your response? and his response? Who could blame him? This is an example of Nifong-Drexel protecting the public. [My emphasis, for legal significance.]

My only disagreement with poster William Wells is: "Unless you have experienced the tactics used by the State Bar, you cannot appreciate the Mike Nifong mentality that permeates the process from start to finish." To the contrary, I think readers can appreciate the thuggish mentality of the State Bar simply by reading its contributions to the discussion. The State Bar communicates with telltale signature rhetoric, immediately conveying how it views its function.

The first commenter was a former State Bar prosecutor who recycles his public relations blurb for Drexel. His boilerplate included this observation: "Not one of the cases I brought to trial resulted in a finding of no culpability." This half-truth is the standard argument for Drexel's project of public posting from a case's inception, and I pointed out that the relevant statistic — even if you trust the Bar Court to provide the criterion — is the percentage of charges dismissed with prejudice, since public posting accuses the attorney of the full set of charges. The Bar Court dismisses the majority of charges!

Normally, the State Bar wouldn't compromise its arrogance or risk exposing its bad motives and poor competence by intervening in a public discussion. The State Bar is so unused to contention that it can't state a rational argument. Instead of dealing with my point about the dismissal with prejudice of most charges, never answered, the at-the-time-anonymous poster referred readers to my State Bar member record; nothing more except to put "position" when referring to "Mr. Diamond's position" in scare quotes.

Back to my quibble with William Wells concerning the need for first-hand experience to appreciate the State Bar's oppressiveness. From the ad hominem method of obfuscation alone, one could already surmise much. The signature use of scare quotes in place of arguments sufficed to categorize the poster as a bar prosecutor. When he replied to my response, which pointed out his refusal to identify himself while attacking me personally, he compromised and signed with his first name, "Patrick": my old friend Supervising Trial Counsel Patrick O'Brien. O'Brien was in charge of my case at the beginning. After he made some intemperate remarks, such as alerting me that he would report my refusal to comment orally as an admission, he transferred the case to our prosecutrix, Melanie J. Lawrence. Apparently the bar thought the case needed a "woman's" touch. [Scare-quote irony intended.]

Apart from these hints to William Wells and others on how to detect oppression at a glance, I want to deal with one other question the Crime & Federalism article raises concerning the Drexel removal: Drexel's prosecution of several San Diego deputy district attorneys. District attorneys usually avoid any bar investigation, but the reason isn't that the bar is reluctant to prosecute district attorneys. The judges, through California's Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, are the only sufficiently centralized authority capable of exerting major power over bar affairs, and district attorneys' withholding evidence doesn't please Chief Justice George. The reason that the State Bar emphasizes civil attorneys is financial. The State Bar zealously enforces attorney trust accounts because the State Bar is the their hidden beneficiary: it receives the interest on most accounts, and the State Bar's authority to disburse these funds augments its power; any trust account violation, any instance of commingling in regular accounts, takes money at the State Bar's disposal. While the client suffers delay following misappropriation, the State Bar is the loser. Misappropriation and comingling are the State Bar staples and the trust accounts the glaring conflict of interest, but, recently, court-order violations have been prominent. To understand the change, more important than the rise and fall of Chief Trial Counsel Drexel in the California bar is the rise of Chief Justice George in the California courts.

The problem with the district-attorney prosecutions isn't inherent wrongfulness. Despite the hypocrisy of the State Bar's prosecuting other prosecutors for withholding exculpatory evidence, district attorneys who withhold evidence and who violate court orders by lying deserve disbarment — harsher discipline than imposed. The problem is the tardiness of these prosecutions, taking place under the State Bar's unlimited statute of limitations for cases the Bar claims to initiate. The lateness shows the prosecutions were at the behest of judges who continued to be dissatisfied with these officers of the court after the ordinary statute of limitations expired. The state-bar-establishment's loyalist defense wing, not the DAs, made the effective response to the district-attorney prosecutions — confirmed by the direction of a phone call preceding the ouster: district attorney to influential bar-defense-counsel Margolis.

Interlude 10. California State Bar Decapitated

The State Bar board of governors fired Chief Trial Counsel Scott J. Drexel yesterday. The discharge is effective next Wednesday; Drexel's contract won't be renewed. State Bar opponents can celebrate Drexel's fall as partly due to their efforts, but they shouldn't expect fundamental change in State Bar practices, which are rooted in its structure, its rules, the provisions of the State Bar Act, and the outlook of the national state-bar establishment.

Scott Drexel fell in a rift between the California State Bar establishment's prosecutorial and defense wings. The various grades of bar trial counsel support Drexel because he allowed the junior prosecutors to run rampant over attorneys' rights, but Drexel's retributionism hurt business for the State Bar's defense wing. Attorneys specializing in State Bar defense are predominantly former state-bar trial counsel. They remain genial with their erstwhile colleagues, who favor these tainted defense counsel in plea bargaining. The State Bar trades lesser discipline — truly an irrelevant consideration for most respondents, whose careers are destroyed by any public discipline — for respondents coached against contention. Under Drexel the deals have been fewer, disadvantaging the State Bar defense establishment and propelling it into a separate professional organization.

Likely the breaking point for the board of governors — which decided in an undemocratic closed meeting — was Drexel's attack on some lawyers as mortgage scammers. Drexel without clear authority required dozens of attorneys to answer inquiries, although he charged few.

Drexel prosecuted more often, seldom settled significant cases, and investigated extravagantly to justify the State Bar's budget during this economic depression. Unfortunately, more than expressing concessions to opponents of State Bar oppression, the rift between Drexel and the State Bar staff, on the one side, and the state-bar defense establishment and other attorneys whose income Drexel crimps, on the other, expresses interests competing for California's diminished fortunes.

61st Installment. State Bar: For employers, against employees

National-state-bar establishmentarians discussed the unwarranted discipline for an attorney's trivial misrepresentation regarding the dates of his employment. (See http://tinyurl.com/d4ftll) Here's how the California Bar Journal summarized the case:

[An attorney] was suspended for one year, stayed, placed on two years of probation with an actual 60-day suspension and was ordered to take the MPRE within one year. The order took effect Aug. 1, 2008.

[He] stipulated that he presented an outdated resume to a prospective employer, committing an act of moral turpitude.

He left the law firm where he worked when it downsized and hired a resume writing service. However, his new resume was not ready when he heard about a job opening, so he submitted an old version, without revising the dates of his previous employment. The resume gave the impression that he was still employed.

[He] later faxed a new resume to the prospective employer but it did not clarify his dates of employment.

David Cameron Carr, president of California-bar-defense-establishment Association of Discipline Defense Counsel, commented revealingly:

Yes, it struck me as unduly harsh, as well, but unfortunately in keeping with the punitive mindset of California State Bar prosecutors since Scott Drexel took over as Chief Trial Counsel in 2005. Almost every discipline decision in California and probably most other states recites that discipline is not punitive but exists to protect the public. It is getting harder and harder to keep this pretense up; those of us who deal with the discipline prosecutors on a daily basis in California see discipline driven by a desire to punish lawyers whom they have decided are bad people. As a former discipline prosecutor (and a former member of NOBC) it is distressing. This punitive mindset has galvanized discipline defense attorneys to formalize our defense bar organization, the Association of Defense Discipline Defense Counsel.

Unlike the Mike Moity case, in which an attorney faced discipline for the tone of voice he took with a magistrate's law clerk, the bar justified discipline under the moral-turpitude standard. Moral turpitude is the one true reason for discipline, but this prosecution shows that unequally applying the right qualitative standard leaves injustices: abuse of prosecutorial discretion and biased meddling in attorneys' disputes.

A guilty defendant can rarely mount an equal-protection defense, giving American prosecutors almost unbridled discretion over charging a lawbreaker. (Sheer, Prosecutorial discretion, Georgetown Law Journal (June 1998).) Prosecutorial discretion advantages the prosecutor's office, which can reward cooperative defendants with reduced charges, a process formalized in plea bargaining. When a lie is widespread but the bar prosecutes only an isolated case, the bar institutes a means of unequal treatment usually unchallengable judicially. Who knows what led a prosecutor to select one person to prosecute, what perhaps private and probably corrupt motive induced the bar to file charges in this minor "resume fraud"?

Yet here we can discern a definite purpose: the State Bar's support of the class of employer attorneys, support shown by the unusually high ethical standards applied one-sidedly to business negotiations outside legal practice. Extraprofessional conduct gets less scrutiny in discipline proceedings: attorneys aren't disciplined for a slightly inaccurate apartment-rental application. The negotiations between an attorney and his boss belong to the business of law, not its practice.

What the State Bar refrains from doing also proves its bias favoring employers. If the bar prosecuted employers for lying to their employees, the bar could handle nothing else, so accepted and widespread is the mendacity of employers, including attorneys. Will the bar discipline this attorney's employer when, informed of the applicant's unemployment, the employer denies him the job and protects his own reputation for fairness by lying about the reason? The bar won't be prosecuting the prevaricating employer for moral turpitude, yet the bar disciplined this attorney for efforts to avoid suffering prejudice. Until the bar charges discipline violations against employer attorneys when they lie to their employees, it should keep hands off employee attorneys who return the favor.

60th Installment. California State Bar becomes bar-establishment laughing stock

The California State Bar became laughing stock of the State Bar Establishment when the attorney general charged clerk Sharon Elyce Pearl with embezzling $675,000. She had persisted for eight years before the California State Bar noticed. (See http://tinyurl.com/ceydkh)

A Legal Ethics Forum blogger posted:

Sad Irony: State Bar victimized by (alleged) staff embezzler: We've all heard countless times about a solo practitioner facing disciplinary consequences because the lawyer's admin embezzled funds. (http://tinyurl.com/cz9rde)

The State Bar Establishment's embarrassment isn't misplaced. The California State Bar, which terms misappropriation by staff a supervising-attorney's willful act—casually adding charges of moral turpitude when any evidence of failure to supervise can be found—proved during an eight-year period that its moralistic stance is a pose. Although the clerk didn't embezzle clients' funds, the ethical culpability is the same because the State Bar held the money as fiduciary of the people and government of California. "All property of the State Bar is hereby declared to be held for essential public and governmental purposes in the judicial branch of the government..." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6008.) The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel, the prosecutorial entity, bears blame because that Office is charged with internal-oversight duties by the same law authorizing the State Bar's prosecution of disciplinary complaints. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6044.)

If the board of governors, which runs the State Bar, can't supervise ordinary commercial operations, how can it supervise the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel? The board of governors was designed to be ineffectual: consecutive (three-year) terms are prohibited, only annual meetings are mandated, and six members must not be lawyers. The Legislature disempowered the board of governors intending to empower the California Supreme Court, the State Bar's other supervisor, but since the Supreme Court has shown that its objectivity departs when the court hears allegations against its State Bar administrative arm, the feebleness of the board of governors unfetters the Chief Trial Counsel. (See Guarino v. Larsen (3rd Cir. 1993) 11 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.4.) Even the sycophantic State Bar Defense Establishment complains about the abrupt change in punitiveness and moralism when a new Chief Trial Counsel takes over.

This comedy isn't one of the gravest harms wreaked by the lawless State Bar, but its reckless failure to supervise public appropriations proves its ethical hypocrisy.

kanBARoo Court. 30B Installment. The State Bar Violates Richard Fine's First Amendment Rights

Litigants defending against legal oppression must contest questions of law, yet litigating the law, as opposed to the facts, requires different skills than trial lawyers possess. Lawyers understand that appellate attorneys form a distinct breed, but the fact-laden content of motions initiating trial-court summary procedures lends them the deceptive appearance of trial-attorney work. Of trial lawyers like Fine innocent of wrongdoing, the few who jurisdictionally attack the notice of disciplinary charges (NDC) sometimes overlook appellate opportunities. While Fine may not be able to undo the omission, Fine's appellate opportunity clarifies the injustice of State Bar intervention into Fine's judicial disputes, implicating Fine's U.S. Constitutional First Amendment rights.

California's Code of Civil Procedure contains an antiSLAPP provision, a special summary procedure. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The California Legislature declares its purpose in the body of the statute:

The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.

The Anti-SLAPP statute provides a special summary procedure and an automatic right of appeal with regard to actions that include, among other legal targets:

[A]ny written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law… (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).)

State Bar v. Fine is the State Bar's legal action against Fine's judicial written and oral statements, subjecting the action to an anti-SLAPP motion unless the statutory exceptions preclude application. The exceptions are not preclusive, including:

This section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor

The office of the Chief Trial Counsel goes unmentioned, as the State Bar is a public corporation, neither connected with any other prosecutor's office nor representing the People.

Filing an anti-SLAPP motion brought to enforce the higher standards of initial proof applied to liberty-chilling legal actions, such as the one by the State Bar against Fine, could win: respondent's legal fees, dismissal with prejudice, and an immediate appeal to the Court of Appeal — bypassing the dubious State Bar Court Review Department — if the Hearing Department denies his anti-SLAPP motion. The Legislature passed the anti-SLAPP statute to protect First Amendment civil liberties by filtering out oppressive lawsuits seeking to deny exercise of basic democratic rights. But consider, if the Legislature worries about the chilling effect of civil suits, such as defamation or malicious prosecution, did it intend to allow draconian State Bar actions against political speech and petitions addressed to the courts? Because Fine addressed the court alone, public-protection considerations don't justify the Bar’s intervention. The Bar doesn't accuse Fine of acts of fraud or misappropriation perpetrated on the public but of vexatious speech before judicial officers holding the contempt power. That power must deter stubbornly frivolous motions — to present the worst-case characterization — since otherwise a judge confronting a contumacious non-attorney in pro per would forfeit control of the court. No emergency arose to justify State Bar intervention against Fine's acts of petition before courts of law.

While Fine arguably waived his right to file an anti-SLAPP motion under a statutory time bar, a more perspicacious account is that the State Bar through its rules denied Fine his right to file an anti-SLAPP motion because the State Bar Court Rules of Procedure makes the motion to dismiss the NDC available as Bar-Court respondents’ exclusive summary procedure. Fine might successfully contend that after relying on its coercive procedures the State Bar is estopped from excuse by Fine's omission below.

Most importantly for Fine — unheard of by the State Bar or the State Bar defense establishment — a defendant/respondent may appeal a trial court's denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, as opposed to petitioning for review. Fine might hope to assert the still substantial remnant of his right to a hearing on appeal before the California Second District.

Best to understand this blog:

* Read the 1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, and 14th Installments, first; or
* Make liberal use of hyperlinks; and then
* Follow your interests; or
* Follow the case.

kanBARoo Court. 24th Installment. What next?

To formulate a legal strategy, I had to determine whether I was dealing with a court, and, if so, from where emanated its jurisprudential imperatives. If the State Bar Court extinguished due process and not merely denied it, my arguments would be self-defeating, leaving “cooperation” with the State Bar the only viable tactic — meaning admit guilt, express remorse, and settle the case by stipulation. This conclusion would vindicate the State Bar defense establishment's method, at cost of vitiating the enterprise’s purported ethical significance.

The Hearing Department’s response to my motions posed a test, in which the prosecutrix screamed that my motions were frivolous, but the court never agreed. Although the Hearing Department was a court, it wasn't much of one. When the Hearing Department offered reasoning in support of decisions, the reasoning failed to take account of any of my arguments except as it misconstrued them. Yet the Hearing Department declined to hold my arguments frivolous and on two occasions granted my motions in substance.

Someone was watching the Hearing Department, but who? Only two possibilities lay in the Hearing Department’s chain of command: the State Bar Court Review Department and the California Supreme Court. The court building's architecture augured that the only honest review would come from the Supreme Court and portended that the Review Department functioned as much a part of an integrated State Bar as the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel and the Hearing Department, but the laws of group dynamics gave some hope that the Review Department and Hearing Department might split. The Review Department’s participation in the conspiracy, its joining the Hearing Department in kowtowing to the Chief Trial Counsel, was proven only when the Review Department's clerk conspired with the prosecutrix to falsify my petition to the Review Department, followed by the Review Department's issuing its denial on the merits, these events timed to occur on the eve of the Hearing Department's OSC. The conspiring Review Department clerk had previously refused to file the papers and announced she had destroyed them.

With the Hearing Department’s entry of my default, I have two options: 1) petition the Review Department to overturn the entry of default and failing that petition the California Supreme Court for review of the Review Department's decision; or 2) wait until the Bar Court enters its final judgment and then petition the Supreme Court for review. I can go immediately to the Review Department and from there to the Supreme Court; or I can go directly to the Supreme Court but only after waiting for the final judgment from the State Bar Court. Cases are rare in which a respondent goes directly to the California Supreme Court, skipping the Review Department. Nobody wants to wait for the announcement that the Bar Court proposes disbarment before challenging the decision.

My anti-waiver strategy compels waiting. Waiting for final judgment carries another advantage when a respondent challenges the notice of disciplinary charges, in opening up an additional basis for appeal, one still more compelling because the entry of default has draconian consequences that turn against the State Bar when it botches the notice of disciplinary charges. When the court orders entry of default, it deems admitted all facts alleged in the notice of disciplinary charges. The protections compare unfavorably with civil defendants against whom the court clerk has entered default. Defaulting civil defendants don't forfeit the presumption of non-liability, and the plaintiff must still prove a case, often to more exacting standards. Legal conclusions are not deemed admitted, even in the State Bar Court. Since the notice alleges scant facts, any judgment will become attackable as based on deeming legal conclusions admitted. The ambiguities in the NDC that made it unanswerable for me are at least equally unresolvable by the State Bar Court.

Best to understand this blog:

* Read the 1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, and 14th Installments, first; or
* Make liberal use of hyperlinks; and then
* Follow your interests; or
* Follow the case.

kanBARoo Court. 19th Installment. Precedent, Waiver, and Legal Strategy: The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel Goes Berserk

California State Bar Court respondents must be especially careful of the intra-case precedents they set, especially waivers, as a respondent can reserve fewer rights against waiver than a criminal or even civil defendant. A criminal defendant's protections are well known, including the exclusion of probative evidence unlawfully obtained. The criminal defendant doesn't waive evidentiary objections by proceeding. None of these rights is afforded the State Bar respondent. Even the civil defendant comes out ahead of the Bar respondent with respect to one crucial difference, which magnifies the likelihood of inadvertent waiver. Although a civil plaintiff can modify a complaint by amendment, 1) the lateness must be excused; and 2) the amendment must not change the cause of action's basic nature. Neither of these protections is available in the State Bar Court. The notice can be changed at any time, even if the reasonably available evidence would have allowed earlier pleading; and no limitation applies to fundamentally changing the charges. If respondent proceeds based on a defective notice of disciplinary charges, any inculpating information gathered under that defective document’s banner retains its full force, regardless of the notice's fate.

The strategic implication, invariably missed by the State Bar establishment defense attorneys, is that failing to assert crucial procedural rights whenever tested loses them. By corollary, I will not answer the notice of disciplinary conduct unless I have exhausted my options to challenge it. Since the Bar Court rules are vague, incomplete, unrefined, and untested, my points and authorities argue rule construction, sometimes reaching public policy. Last Friday provided another opportunity to implement this anti-waiver strategy when the prosecutrix filed a new (third) motion to enter default for failing to answer the notice of disciplinary charges, to which I will eschew filing an opposition. Any application or counterapplication to the court now risks mooting my request for an immediate stay and waiving my objections that the clerk’s office has become unreliable. Since the clerk’s office is unreliable, any filing introduces an uncertainty for me, a litigation burden that no duty requires carrying. Refusal to accelerate the proceedings artificially by prematurely answering the notice of disciplinary charges also pressures the court to rule for a stay, to avoid its own befuddlement while it investigates the clerk's office.

The factors allowing me to prevail are 1) the fundamental strength of the pleading theory, forcing the Bar Court to treat it seriously; 2) the severe misconduct of the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel; and 3) taking advantage of the prosecutrx's misconduct, by consistent refusal to waive procedural flaws. The State Bar of late has followed the opposite course. More descriptively, the Bar has gone berserk. So far from consistency, it has now filed two incompatible motions: a motion to reconsider the denial of its motion for default and, before that, a new refiling of the original motion. An improper motion for reconsideration is ordinarily sanctionable, as is remaking a denied motion. While the law grants an over-used right to plead contradictory legal theories, it does not grant the right to proceed on a procedural contradiction. It is one or the other, a motion for reconsideration or a motion proper. The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel improperly burdens the court and opposing party with contradictory procedural forms. In my 11 years of practicing law and supplying legal theories to litigators, I have never before seen the procedural presumptuousness as involved in filing for reconsideration when the underlying motion is pending.

My novel strategy frightens the State Bar. The Bar's power to move for entry of default and involuntarily enroll Bar Members as inactive goes to the heart of its unfair advantage. Without it, the State Bar’s trial counsel would have to practice law, a prospect most alarming.

To understand this blog:

• Read Installments 1-3, 5, 7, and 14 first, in that order; then follow your interests; or
• Follow your interests, and make liberal use of hyperlinks.

kanBARoo Court, 7th Installment, My Defense in a Nutshell

The gravamen of my defense before the California State Bar Court is that conclusory notice of charges is insufficient to meet the pleading requirements of the State Bar Court's Rules of Procedure. (Rules Proc., rule 101(b)(2) & (3).)

My case's procedural form can conceal the core issue, right to notice, as a matter bearing on high policy, not only individual cases. If my experience is typical—and why should it not be, absent legal obstacles to deter the State Bar Court—then the modus operandi of the State Bar is to file the most general allegations, with no showing of how particular alleged infractions violate the rule or statute in question. The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel then launches a fishing expedition, where the respondent has protection inferior to that afforded in ordinary civil or criminal matters. This conduct defeats the purpose of initial pleadings and formal charges.

My case rests on two foundational premises, establishing pleading requirements in the California State Bar Court:

1. The California Supreme Court reprimanded the State Bar Court in a line of cases. (See Lipson v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1010, 1016; Sugarman v. State Bar of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 609; Baker v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 804 ; Maltaman v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 924, 931; and Guzzetta v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 962, 968.). The Supreme Court offers commentary comical in its seeming futility. In each opinion, the Supreme Court inserts a frustrated remonstrance: "Once again we are constrained to call to the attention of the State Bar Court the importance of identifying with specificity both the rule or statutory provision that underlies each charge and the manner in which the conduct allegedly violated that rule or statutory provision. While petitioner here does not complain of any due process violation in lack of notice, this specificity is also essential to meaningful review of the recommendation of the State Bar Court."
2. The general rules of pleading that underlie the State Bar's Rules of Procedure are committed on principle to factual pleading.

The Supreme Court warned repeatedly that the State Bar provides insufficient notice when it fails to connect law and wrongful conduct. Yet, the theory has not been used by any previous respondent. The failure to apply the law after it has been set out points to the extremely low level of practice in State Bar Court defense. These installments discuss the causes.

kanBARoo Court, 6th Installment, The Benninghoff Miscarriage of Justice

The State Bar Establishment feeds rule by bureaucratic reflex and justification by cheap moralism. A section of the law professariat avidly supports this trend as affording license to display their moral superiority. These are natural allies of the State Bar Establishment. Astute observers know that those most aggressively publicizing their moral credentials likely are themselves psychopaths, particularly when they do it to others' detriment.

What to surmise when a law professor begins a blog entry with: "Don't be a sleazeball"? What to surmise when this professor's errors of fact are pointed out, the law professor considers the matter so unimportant that he deigns not even to correct the errors of fact. The State Bar as constituted is not the institution to do it, but outrageous libelous publication warrants discipline for moral turpitude. Certainly the demonstrated lack of concern for truth warrants the writer's removal as a law professor.

The blog entry belongs to one Professor Shaun Martin, and the entry appears at http://tinyurl.com/244lqw The case on which Martin comments is published at Benninghoff v Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 61. Professor Martin recites facts scarcely recognizable as belonging to the same case. Martin's most egregious errors are 1) he pretends that the court found that Benninghoff's representation before federal administrative law courts was unauthorized practice of law, when Benninghoff prevailed on this issue; and 2) Martin pretends that Benninghoff was found to have violated laws barring the unauthorized practice of law, whereas the Court of Appeal refused to rule on that question, finding instead that Benninghoff breached a special set of standards pertaining to the practice of law by former attorneys. The first lie is so false and so foul that I will abjure further discussion, lest the stench — to use one of Professor Martin's choice terms — prove infectious. The subject of this installment is the second misrepresentation of the facts and the court's opinion because it highlights the pitfalls in Bar Defense by even experienced and zealous advocates and points to the level of legal theorizing necessary to keep the State Bar from devouring the law.

Benninghoff's web site at http://www.administrativelaw.net/ shows that the Court of Appeal failed to mention substantial contrary law argued before it. This showing did not suffice to win a Supreme Court review. To prevail, Benninghoff needed to raise deeper issues of law. Had the court said that the law prohibits nonattorneys appearing at administrative hearings, the issue could be addressed at the familiar level of case law and judicial council opinions. The court did not address it at that level because the State Bar would not have prevailed on those considerations, precedent considered. The Court of Appeal opted to save part of the State Bar's case by distinguishing the duties of a resigned or disbarred attorney, on the one hand, and laymen who have never been attorneys, on the other. By making this distinction the Court of Appeal reached the decision it apparently wanted to reach, but it did so by crafting a rule absurd on its face and unconscionably arbitrary on analysis.

When you go up against the State Bar, you deal with a legally unsophisticated agency that will take any of your rights it can. That is the only way the California State Bar can function, as it lacks the legal aptitude and experience to litigate difficult questions of professional ethics. The workload facing the appellate courts these days is so heavy that you cannot expect the court to recognize the absurdity of the State Bar's position spontaneously. You must fight a battle directed against the oppressively arbitrary distinctions the State Bar will try to foist on your case, attacking them at their root, not at the most superficial legal level possible.

Superficial attack is usually the favored way to proceed. You don't raise questions of constitutional magnitude unless you absolutely have to. When you have a serious case before the State Bar, you have to. You must energetically break certain routines and habits of ordinary litigation, because you are encountering a force whose strength consists of its brazen willingness to draw arbitrary and oppressive distinctions and of its institutional connections, which gain acceptance for its travesties.

Think about what the State Bar is saying and what the Court of Appeal held. The State Legislature can impose special punishments on persons based on their occupational history. When you become a lawyer, you forfeit forever the rights everyone else has, even (and especially) if you cease being a lawyer. Having been a lawyer, according to the Court of Appeal, you can never again represent parties in a lay capacity, even where anyone else but a former lawyer has this right. This must strike any fair-minded person as oppressive and insane. What will the next law be: that any citizen can home school his children unless he has previously worked as a teacher?

Fortunately, there is a term for such legislation — or as here, construal of legislation. Standards are in place to preclude these arbitrary manipulations of the law, to prevent the courts or the legislature depriving citizens of rights unrelated to any punishment for any crime they have suffered conviction. As any fair-minded person's gut reaction will tell him, precluding this kind of law is a very basic kind of right. It is so basic that to reach it, you need to go to the original U.S. Constitution, beyond even the Bill of Rights. If the concepts are unfamiliar, it is because no one except the State Bar would propose a distinction so invidious and have the social weight to get approval by the Court of Appeal.

Benninghoff v. Superior Court construed Government Code section 6126, subdivision (b), in so crazy a manner that it turned it into a bill of attainder. The prohibition of bills of attainder serves the separation of powers, the prevention of legislative infringement on the judiciary's prerogatives to find guilt and to punish. "The Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function or more simply — trial by legislature." (U.S. v. Brown (1965) 381 U.S. 437, 440.) As James Madison explained ""Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligations of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation." (Federalist Number 44 (1788).)

The Legislature cannot pass laws specially punishing resigned or even disbarred attorneys without trial and remain within the U.S. Constitution. Punishment is for the judiciary, and any law construed as a bill of attainder must be invalidated. The Bar Establishment must be precluded from imposing punishment by attainder on lawyers and obfuscating the real issues with its strident moralism. To fight the Bar you must be able and willing to deal with the most fundamental issues.

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