100th Installment. California State Bar Colludes with Gray-Market Criminals: Nefarious Collection Practices using “Wakefield Associates” on Bogus “Debt”

The State Bar’s collection practices

The California State Bar employs gray-market criminals, illegal collection thugs, to try to recover its unconscionable “costs” from respondents. These collection thugs try to harass respondents into paying the invented sums.

Collections are ineffectually federally regulated under the Fair Debt Collection Act, which makes it illegal to call people to annoy them. (§ 806, subd. 5 [“causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy … any person at the called number”].) The collector the California State Bar uses—Wakefield Associates, based in Colorado—is one of numerous illegal collections operations, which go unprosecuted because they systematically avoid pursuing supposed debtors in their home states. This is the key to recognizing them: legitimate collection is by writ of execution on a judgment, for which being based in a different state is disadvantageous. These thugs’ motto is “a call a day until you pay.” They will deny they are engaging in harassment, by refusing to admit the obvious: that harassment is the only conceivable definition for calling someone who makes it clear they want you to stop. 

To eliminate the interstate collections thugs would require more than the ineffectual Federal Trade Commission, charged with enforcing the Fair Debt Collection Act: the U.S. Justice Department would need to concern itself, but the Justice Department is fully occupied with providing legal cover for torture at Guantanamo and waging its war against adolescents using birth control.

Dealing with collection thugs

The gray-market collections operations obfuscate three basic legal principles, which suffice for anyone having to confront these criminals:

1. Collectors have rights no greater than their creditor principals.
2. Creditors have rights no greater than any other citizen.
3. No citizen can dictate what another says over the telephone, but anyone can (only) deny permission to phone.

From these principles, it follows that it suffices legally to tell a collector you don’t want to deal with it to compel it to stop calling. But then, collections thugs operate outside the law (their basis of existence consists of illegal practices: badgering weak, ignorant people into paying supposed debts). Realistically, much more is required to deter them: anyone who calls one of these criminals back a few times—or more—should be commended for performing a public service. (Legally, you can call these telephone tough guys back as many times as you like and say what you want: they can hardly complain of harassment—although they’ll threaten—since they initiated communication and insist on continuing it.)

Birds of a feather

Where is the California State Bar in prosecuting the attorneys who advise these gray-market criminals on how to avoid prosecution? The answer is that they aren’t to be seen, where the State Bar colludes with these criminal collections’ operations. The specific collection syndicate used by the California State Bar engages in the usual violations of local anti-harassment and federal statutes but goes a step further. The Fair Debt Collection Act requires that the collector disclose its identity to caller ID, but Wakefield Associates refuses. Even when it identifies itself orally, it refrains from revealing it’s a private collection company, deceptively identifying itself as “the judicial recovery unit.” Although I doubt they would fool any state-bar respondent, some other corrupt judicial organs must use Wakefield Associates’ services, and they succeed in deceiving the legally naïve into fearing that criminal justice is their pursuer. The business model of these gray-market criminals is otherwise inexplicable. For the California State Bar, thuggery is business as usual.

Interlude 26. At ABA Conference, California State Bar prosecutor Melanie J. Lawrence—notorious felon—denies the existence of prosecutorial misconduct

Prosecutorial misconduct has become so rampant in the U.S. that official ethicists recognize a problem of state-bar failure to prosecute prosecutors. kanBARoo court 85th Installment, California State Bar gives prosecutors free pass: From Philip Cline to Melanie J. Lawrence, concluded that state bars fail to prosecute prosecutors because state-bar prosecutors themselves commit rampant misconduct. A conclave of official ethicists and state-bar enforcers in Chicago last August illuminated the problem, first through the insights of academician Ellen Yaroshefsky of Cardozo Law and functionary Maureen E. Mulvenna of the Illinois state-bar establishment; second, from the example in their midst, Melanie J. Lawrence, representing the California State Bar. (Hat Tip: Helen W. Gunnarsson.)

Yaroshefsky explained research findings: winning outweighs legality when moralism convulses prosecutors once they convince themselves of the defendant's guilt.

Mulvenna described a case, In re Howes (D.C. 2012) 39 A.3d 1, which exposes the depth of state-bar complicity in prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutor Howes bribed inmate witnesses to appear, by illegally dispersing witness-voucher funds. Howes then lied to the court to conceal the influence and embezzlement. Shockingly, half of the hearing panel favored a mere suspension, some members recommending duration as short as one year, on the ground that the prosecutor acted for meritorious reasons: convicting a guilty defendant.

One dissenter denied the problem: Lawrence—a functional illiterate in the law—with emblematic California State Bar unearned arrogance and condescension, lectured the academicians to “go and read the reports for yourself.” Lawrence’s denial is not the result of naivete. Lawrence knows the California State Bar ignores prosecutorial misconduct, because she perpetrated proven misconduct in full view of the State Bar and not only got away with it but was twice promoted. (See also: 14th Installment, Turning Point, including Comments;15th Installment, PREDICT the Court's Ruling; and 22nd Installment, Can you tell victory from defeat?) Delegating Lawrence to opine on prosecutorial misconduct further ratifies hers and proves the problem the California State Bar dispatched Lawrence to Chicago to deny. 

85th Installment. California State Bar gives prosecutors free pass: From Philip Cline to Melanie J. Lawrence

kanBARoo court differs from most other judicial-system criticisms in declining to demand more prosecutions. Often critics respond to inequities in justice's administration by demanding prosecutions of the truly guilty, not just relief for the unjustly prosecuted. No doubt, one might derive satisfaction from reporting judges or gloating over their comeuppance, but this satisfaction comes at the expense of consistency and principle: advocacy of prosecution by a corrupt, oppressive, or incompetent agency contradicts the intended defense of due process. Only perpetration of crimes so great they overshadow the State Bar's defects—John Yoo is the only example that comes to mind—justifies supporting (never advocating!) state-bar prosecutions. kanBARoo court doesn't advocate prosecution even in the extreme case of Ronald N. Gottschalk or Melanie J. Lawrence. Nor did I report Lawrence's criminal misconduct to the State Bar as some advised; I refused even to report Kim and company to the police, as the state's prosecutorial authority differs from that of the state bar in its greater competence, not greater inclination to justice. Principled opponents of authoritarian oppression don't beseech the oppressive authorities!

Therefore, readers shouldn't interpret the following critique of failure to prosecute prosecutors as a demand for their prosecution. To avoid the misunderstanding of an important principle, I emphasize this caveat, even at the expense of the main message; but principles don't preclude publicizing and analyzing failures to prosecute, omissions laying bare the state-bars' mainsprings. With that caveat, I proceed with clear conscience to describe the California State Bar's astounding failure to prosecute prosecutors

Recently, the Northern California Innocence Project released a study of prosecutor misconduct staggering in demonstrating prosecutory bias. One fact stands out in this report: over the past decade, the State Bar has disciplined only six prosecutors for misconduct in prosecution. (Hat Tip to The Crime Report.) Business & Professions Code sections 6086.7 and 6086.8, subdivision (a), require judges to report misconduct that affects trial outcome, and mandatory "reported events" by judges produced approximately one thousand reports over the period studied, but of these, only six led to state-bar sanctions of prosecutors in criminal cases. For most practical purposes, we can justly say the California State Bar refuses to prosecute any prosecutor. (The only exception is the recent prosecution of four prosecutors, comprising the bulk of the six. This prosecution resulted from a power-struggle within the state bar that led to Chief Trial Counsel Scott Drexel's ouster and represented a crude attempt to appease the discontented state-bar defense establishment.)

The Mark Sodersten case shows how this refusal plays out, how the free pass given prosecutors is intentional rather than (somehow) merely negligent. Sodersten is one of the great success stories of the Northern California Innocence Project, which seeks exoneration for victims of the criminal-justice system who didn't commit the crimes charged. The California Court of Appeal freed Sodersten based on evidence the Innocence Project discovered proving he was the victim of withholding evidence by the prosecutor, who himself had interviewed the potentially exonerating witness, so there was no legitimate question about the concealment's willfulness. This prosecutor was a real fiend; can you imagine asking for the death penalty for a defendant who you know was convicted on falsified evidence? Since the evidence was exonerating, one can go so far as to say this prosecutor demanded the death penalty for someone he knew was innocent.

 
The California State Bar couldn't avoid opening an investigation of Philip Cline, then a Tulare County assistant district attorney, but it refused to find culpability, claiming insufficiency of evidence, a deficiency deterring the State Bar in no other prosecution. The free pass allowed this prosecutor to flourish: this attempted murderer is now district attorney for Tulare County.

Sodersten shows the California State Bar isn't merely lax about prosecuting prosecutors but actively resists finding prosecutors guilty. Opponents of the State Bar establishment have an interest in knowing why. One theory, advanced by the loyal opposition of the California State Bar establishment, the Association of Discipline Defense Counsel and its leader, David Cameron Carr. Carr, claims that the state bar is really a consumer-protection agency rather than an enforcer of ethical principles, implying that the disciplinary mechanism within government agencies adequately protects the public. The theory can't explain the intensity of resistance to prosecuting prosecutors; it explains at most a lack of emphasis on such prosecutions. Carr would have it that the State Bar doesn't consider prosecutorial misconduct important enough to prosecute, a premise that doesn't explain outright refusal to prosecute. The data also refute a theory I proposed, that the State Bar is unconcerned with prosecuting "government attorneys" because there's no money in it, the State Bar having an interest in the trust accounts of civil attorneys, as it retains the interest on these accounts. This too explains only lack of concern, not determined avoidance.

"Government lawyers" is a misleading abstraction. I haven't seen figures on prosecutions of other "government attorneys;" the record concerning public defenders would be particularly interesting. But even if the prosecution rates are low across the board for lawyers working for government, this 1) still doesn't explain active resistance to prosecution of prosecutors; and 2) doesn't explain why common sense and the obvious need for discipline for misconduct of the sort Philip Cline perpetrated doesn't compel making an exception to any rule exempting "government lawyers," since the imperatives that apply to prosecutors don't apply to other classes of "government lawyers." An unethical monster like Philip Cline is a moral threat whether or not he leaves government service. No client should trust such a creature; none should have to risk association with him.

Prosecutorial solidarity is the only tenable explanation I find for the State Bar's avid refusal to prosecute prosecutors. The State Bar, after all, effectively is composed of prosecutors, and the boundary between prosecutors in general criminal practice and State Bar "trial counsel" is porous, the State Bar the refuge of the most incompetent of the lot, not necessarily the most vile. The prosecutors in the State Bar have a stake in not seeing other prosecutors prosecuted because, in general, prosecutors often engage in misconduct, particularly State Bar prosecutors. While the State Bar has no shortage of hypocrisy, it knows its self-interest. Once prosecution of prosecutors becomes common, why wouldn't a public outcry demand prosecution of "trial counsel"? By all indications, serious misconduct by these bar prosecutors is a common occurrence, even the norm. Every prosecutor has an interest in such misconduct getting a free pass.

The evidence of State Bar misconduct is rife throughout its cases, but the most rigorously proven instance happens to have occurred in my State Bar case, where "deputy trial counsel" Melanie J. Lawrence actually destroyed documents to obtain dismissal of my petition for review. Precisely because the evidence is circumstantial, hence not dependent on testimony, the proof of her misconduct is airtight. Readers can verify this tolerance for misconduct by bar counsel all the way from the nefarious Judge Honn to an indifferent California Supreme Court. Lawrence and the attorneys representing the state bar consistently refused to address the charges of misconduct; with proof so clear, they determined to stonewall. While my briefs pounded away on the subject, the State Bar's briefs ignored my allegations. They needed to craft no arguments; they simply pretended my claims were absent. Subsequently, no investigation was opened, despite the proof I briefed.

While Philip Cline is district attorney of Tulare County, Melanie J. Lawrence continues in employment by the State Bar. The State Bar doesn't prosecute prosecutors for misconduct because, out of self-interest and empathy, it favors such misconduct.

kanBARoo Court. Interlude 6. Making a federal case of it

My case, based on indisputable allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, proves due-process challenge strategies in disbarment cases shouldn't culminate in the California Supreme Court or below. My case tested and refuted the only theory on offer, alternative to bias, to explain the Supreme Court's post-1991 State Bar abstention. My theory said fundamental legal challenges seldom occurred in State Bar cases because the respondent's cost, incurred to avoid waiver — "involuntary enrollment inactive" — is too high.

I learn, as I get customers often owning greater working knowledge of the system than I, the causal picture is more complex. The determiner of State Bar Court decisions, when it wants to be, is the Board of Governors, the partly politically appointed, partly elected body that controls the State Bar. The incompetence of State Bar defense counsel also has an extra-legal complication, in a shadow organization of former State Bar trial counsel, an organization bestowed with a monopoly over striking deals, each sold at the going rate of a $50 thousand to $100 thousand in attorney's fee. These shadow-group State Bar defense attorneys, my sources tell me, compensate "referring" State Bar counsel with expensive gifts.

Despite the failure of a California Supreme Court strategy for fundamental legal attack, I remain convinced that only a fundamental attack can force dismissal in a disbarment case. The remaining realistic possibility for fundamental disbarment cases is attacking the U.S. Constitutional invalidity of parts of the State Bar Act in federal district court. A federal district court perspective depends on attributing statutory origin to one of the State Bar Court's systemic abuses. Informed customers say these abuses include, in addition to the State Bar's asserting monopoly power over defense counsel: pursuing charges the State Bar Investigator admits the State Bar knows are groundless; willfully withholding exculpatory evidence from in pro per respondents; and applying unlawful conditions, such as restricting potential counsel, to releasing exculpatory evidence. My case and experience adds others, such as deflecting or destroying court documents, proof of service fraud, and extortionate resignation demands.

My petition for rehearing offers no hope of resuscitating a California strategy. One reason, the petition's chances are slender at best. Why even slender? Because only the petition for rehearing contains a reply to a State Bar opposition. The State Bar troubled itself to avoid reply to its opposition to my petition for writ of review. Neither could I reply to the State Bar's opposition to my motion to strike, Rules of Court not permitting. When a court pays attention according to its preferences and acts according to its habits, a reply, as contained in my petition for rehearing, is the most important document. But if the Supreme Court were to grant my petition for rehearing, the court still had acted with such a degree of negligence that reliance on that court cannot ground a sound perspective. Reckless rubber-stamping seems the only explanation for apparent Supreme Court abstention, other than explaining it as invoking a surreptitious non-rebuttable presumption favoring the State Bar. My petition for rehearing in the California Supreme Court, consequently, doesn't even potentially rehabilitate the California high court as the target legal arbiter.

I am soliciting reports of State Bar prosecutorial misconduct, to help understand the State Bar's systemic due process violations. This information will help some of my customers and potentially an unknown number of California attorneys. Correspondents should feel free to e-mail reports anonymously.

kanBARoo Court. 16th Installment. What happened?

Nobody ventured a prediction as to how the court would rule, and I can't say I blame you. The court was in a nice predicament, and who could say what it would do? If it entered my default, I'm out of court and the Hearing Department avoids the Review Department's interlocutory review. The cost, however, is setting me up to win on an appeal based — not on my theory that the Bar hasn't pled its case with specificity (which may or may not be mooted) — but on the concrete and specific facts of court's failure to protect my due process rights from the prosecutrix's incursions.

What was the alternative? If the court denied the motion to dismiss, it would be countenancing my accusations of deputy trial counsel's intermeddling. This would then require that it investigate and disbar her, to the shame of the State Bar and with uncalculated implications for my case and other cases she has handled. As close and as subordinating as the relations are between the office of the prosecutrix's boss and the judge, this was unlikely.

I'm now going to get the anticlimactic ending out of the way, to proceed without that pall to the completely unexpected and truly fascinating details. Then to the apperception that the case has matured sufficiently that I can see how I can win it. This case has moved beyond the point where one sets the stage so that favorable events can transpire. The anticlimactic ending is that the judge managed to deny the prosecutrix's motion to enter default based on an apparently technical fault in the prosecutrix's motion.

Boring in appearance; fascinating in essence. First, the court could avoid considering my charges of gross prosecutorial misconduct only because it never saw them. The court never received my opposition papers. The prosecutrix must have had the file copy intercepted or deflected, after receiving her service copy and finding herself inculpated. I find it hard to believe, but in assessing likelihoods, you have to follow the logic of the evidence.

What's fascinating about the way the judge justified denying the motion to enter default was that he was dead wrong about the technicality he invoked. The judge had before him an unopposed motion to enter default that he so strongly needed to deny that he concocted a transparently unsound reason to deny the home team's motion. The judge ruled that the motion was untimely, because it failed to allow the five days for service added to the time ordered by the court. In truth, not only the prosecutrix but I as well believed, and believed correctly, that since the court said 20 days from the order's filing, it meant exactly that, not 20 days from the order's service. Every paralegal knows the distinction.

There are so many things fishy about this that it would be tedious to list more than a couple. Why did the court grant the motion to shorten time, if the motion failed on its face because of untimeliness? Why did the court fail to condition the denial as “without prejudice to remaking the motion," if the court's real reason was mere untimeliness?

What the court did do was vacate the trial date, vacate the pretrial conference date, and set an OSC to consider sanctions for my failing to participate in discovery. I responded the next day (today) with a motion to reconsider the order for an OSC, in light of the "new facts" contained in my deflected opposition to the default. I attached a copy of the deflected opposition as an exhibit and mailed a copy with cover letter to the judge by certified mail, labeled "PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL."

In the installment after the next, I'll discuss how this level of prosecutorial misconduct creates a straight tactical path to prevailing in this matter. The potential contrasts with the anemic pseudostrategies of Bar Establishment defense lawyers, who generally have spent years as deputy trial counsel for the State Bar, where they were thoroughly brainwashed. In the next installment, posted concurrently, I publish my "Motion to Dismiss the Notice of Disciplinary Charges for Failing to State Disciplinable Charges." It sets out the basic procedural legal theory that has gotten this case to this point, although my later papers include some more compelling authorities.

To best understand this blog:

* Consider reading installments 1-7, successively; then,

* Follow your interests.

kanBARoo Court. Interlude 2. Discussion is better than monologue

Discussion of State Bar Court in relation to general prosecutorial misconduct.

http://tinyurl.com/236bnx

Published here with permission:

(My original comments are prefaced by '>>.' jl's comments are prefaced by '>.' My response to jl's comments have no preface.)

>>On Dec 10, 2:52 am, Stephen wrote: I have posted before about my personal
>>State Bar discipline case. Bluntly put, I charged that the State Bar
>>showed its incompetence and its dishonesty in manipulating its already
>>flawed procedural rules. The question crossed my mind, how far is the Bar
>>willing to go? Will it do anything to win? I didn't doubt the Bar's will,
>>but I did doubt its power, since ultimately, the Bar Court is subject to
>>review by the California Supreme Court. On the other hand, given the
>>power to do whatever it needed to win, it did not occur to me that its
>>incompetence might get in the way, even of winning by some form of
>>cheating.

> Do you have an absolute right of review or merely a right to petition
> for a writ of certiorari?

The right to a review by the Review Department of the State Bar Court is absolute. The Review Department's decision is reviewable only by certiorari to the California Supreme Court The review for which I filed was thus of right.

The Review Department and the Hearing Department, however, are both part of an integrated State Bar Court. The intermeddling clerk was acting for the Review Department, but sits in the same office with the Hearing Department clerks, even possibly sharing work.

> I have seen appellate courts crawl up trees backwards to avoid cert,
> despite official transcripts and records glaring with reversible
> error.

>>One never knows everything in advance. The State Bar has resorted to a
>>trick far cruder than I imagined it prepared to try. And it might be so
>>incompetent as to get caught in the process. The State Bar has
>>inadvertently provided me with proof of its dishonesty. The State Bar
>>trial counsel did nothing less than doctor court files to cause a
>>responsive pleading I tried to file to be rejected on technical grounds.
>>By substituting papers and destroying papers, it caused the clerk to
>>claim that I had filed a document without a proof of service and had
>>filed 4 copies instead of five. For these alleged sins, it rejected the
>>filing and destroyed all the documents I had sent to the clerk, putting
>>me in default and potentially out of court. Although the penalties it
>>tries to impose through the clerk's office are unlawful, that is far from
>>the most shocking aspect, because I can prove that to get this result,
>>the Deputy Trial Counsel had to substitute her own document version for
>>the one I sent to the clerk. This moreover is EASY TO PROVE. It boils
>>down to this simple question: Can the Deputy Trial Counsel produce a copy
>>her copy of the proof of service? How do I know whether it is or isn't
>>her copy? Each copy I sent out, whether signed or not, was dated by hand
>>in ink. You, readers, have little reason to take my word for what I can
>>prove. But you can wonder, why would I make an accusation that can so
>>easily be _disproven_ if untrue. Although my blog receives ample hits, no
>>one has commented. This confuses me. Isn't it obviously a matter of
>>import if the State Bar, that is charged with rooting out unethical
>>conduct, resorts to conduct not only unethical but frankly criminal? How
>>can this not have a tremendously bad affect on the whole practice of law,
>>affecting everyone in the end? Comments of any kind help me tremendously
>>in figuring things out. Please consider commenting at my latest
>>installment, which contains the actual motion I filed opposing the entry
>>of default that the State Bar engineered. The latest installment is
>>located at:

>> http://kanbaroo.blogspot.com/2007/12/kanbaroo-court-installment-15-pr...
>>
>> srd

> It looks as though, if you have proof, your opponent should herself be
> brought up before the bar.

Thank you for pointing this out. Of course, I know the offense is an ethical infraction, but I had not thought of actually filing a complaint with the State Bar.

What had occurred to me is filing a police report. While I now write briefs in all areas of law, my direct legal experience is limited to civil matters -- primarily in business litigation, with focus on breach of contract, and in personal injury. I don't know about the effectiveness of a police report in this matter.

A police report matter arose in another context. The events leading to the Bar's inquisition comprised a fraud conducted from my office, involving persons unknown to me, with whom I had not formed an attorney-client relationship. The defrauded were Korean-speaking persons, and the defrauders were Korean-speaking staff, who conversed among themselves in their native language. The State Bar argues that I should have reported the fraud to the police. This seemed a futile act, because I was not the direct victim of the fraud, and I lacked the evidence, which was in the hands of unknown defrauded persons.

In the present Bar fraud, I have the proof of service that I mailed to the offending Deputy Trial Counsel, but the main evidence is the prospective failure of that attorney to produce her copy of that document, that is, to produce an unsigned but hand-dated proof of service. Someone must request that she produce the document and inspect its date to determine that it is a reproduction. Who will undertake this investigation and perform it with integrity? Can the Presiding Judge of the State Bar Court be counted on first to undertake the investigation and then to make an honest report? It would be fairly easy, with perhaps limited potential repercussions, for an investigator falsely to report finding an original in Deputy Trial Counsel's possession. To make that determination, the investigator has to run a finger over the date, making a judgment, although an easy one that clerks perform routinely.

The likelihood of proper investigation depends on whether Deputy Trial Counsel acted independently. Did the Presiding Judge covertly instruct her to intermeddle? My blog recounts evidence of ex parte communication between the two. I lean toward thinking that the judge was in on it. Perhaps his permission was more general, and he might not have countenanced counsel's method, but only because he is smarter than she is, not necessarily more ethical. The Bar Court in practice is a closely integrated institution.

> It reminds me of Shakespeare's remark in _Measure for Measure_ where
> the jury "passing on the prisoner's life, may in the sworn twelve have
> a thief or two guiltier than him they try."

The Bar Court's offense here is no doubt more serious than any of mine, even as alleged. My actual offense would properly sound in general negligence in civil court. If the fraud were shown the result of my negligent supervision, one could argue that staff's fraud is a reasonably foreseeable consequence. It is not properly a matter of legal malpractice, since I formed no attorney-client relationship with the persons defrauded. Any negligence would be a violation of my general duty to use reasonable care to prevent injury, a duty having nothing specifically to do with the practice of law.

> We have found in our state that the official bar has been an
> employment repository for the inept and for scoundrels. Because of
> media pressure and the influence of wealthy parents our bar snatched
> the license of DA Mike Nifong, but sat inert and did nothing in even
> more alarming cases where corrupt prosecutors committed felonies to
> obtain murder convictions. Alan Gell was almost executed because of
> affirmative corruption by two prosecutors who barely got their wrists
> slapped by the bar.
>
> Scott Brewer and Kenneth Honeycutt were prosecutors who committed
> felonies to win a death row conviction of Jonathan Hoffman. Hoffman
> was later exonerated when it was discovered that the prosecutors hid
> from the defense, judge, and jury the lavish gifts they had bestowed
> on prosecution witnesses.

> The bar never touched these two corrupt prosecutors. The NC State Bar
> waited until the statute of limitations ran, and now those two
> scoundrels are untouchable. One of them even became a district court
> judge, and other one is still practicing law.
>
> The older I got and the more I practiced law, the more I saw it was
> politics, not law, that ruled the courthouses. You could call it the
> law of the jungle. And the politics of the courthouses are the black
> arts of malice, party loyalties, and faction. That's likely what you
> have to deal with.

I find an interesting question in the extent to which State Bar-enforcement problems reflect general problems with prosecution, exacerbated by the Bar's lesser competence, or on the other hand, represent a driving force.

May I have your permission to publish this discussion to my blog? Often discussion is more clarifying than monologue.