Showing posts with label involuntary enrollment inactive. Show all posts
Showing posts with label involuntary enrollment inactive. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 4, 2009

Interlude 16. The Ronald N. Gottschalk Matter: State Bar Incompetence or Collusion


In the 2nd Installment I opined that the State Bar's incompetence overshadowed even its malice:
These Installments cannot directly prove the State Bar's penchant for unjust prosecution, even in a single case. They do not target injustice as such because, in truth, injustice is not the basic problem. From what I have learned through dealing with the State Bar, failure to prosecute and insufficiency of charges are as likely as overzealousness to define the State Bar's performance. These Installments should not convince readers that State Bar biases produce harsh outcomes but rather that the incompetence of the State Bar is so extreme that the Bar machinery will necessarily produce the wrong outcome. Incompetence more than overzealousness is the defining trait of the California State Bar, and such incompetence benefits no one except the guiltiest.
kanBARoo court focuses on wrongful prosecution rather failure to prosecute. We shouldn't encourage the State Bar in any prosecutions because its integrity and competence can't be vouchsafed, and even the most culpable deserve better; but perspective requires recognizing the laxity interpenetrating harshness in a broad picture of incompetence. A particularly troubling laxity ramification is the possibility that the State Bar will delay prosecution of some of the most corrupt attorneys as remuneration for informing on other respondents.

Case in point the Ronald Norton Gottschalk case. In Interlude 8 I warned the public about this attorney, whom I termed a "legal predator," and I also noted that he eagerly played State Bar stooge when he threatened kanBARoo court with a RICO suit. Gottschalk was recently arrested on embezzlement charges. While his guilt remains for proof in court, the standard of proof for enrolling an attorney inactive (an administrative suspension to avert harm to the public) is far lower than proof, and the Bar is avid in its routine imposition of these suspensions for mere procedural reasons. Yet the November 2009 California Bar Journal (http://tinyurl.com/kzqxroy) contains this amazing statement, following Gottschalk's arrest, from Gottschalk's State Bar prosecutor, Paul O'Brien:
We believe public protection demands that Gottschalk be enrolled "not entitled to practice" at the earliest possible moment.
O'Brien went on to praise Investigator John Noonen for his "dogged pursuit of the case."

These  incompetent, self-congratulatory State Bar prosecutors and cops remind of nothing more than former President Bush when he commented on the "heck of a job" his staff had performed after Hurricane Katrina. The DA has charged Gottschalk with hard embezzlement of more than $350,000. Since the standard of proof for involuntary enrollment inactive is far too low, even a State Bar prosecutor could marshal the incriminating facts:
The board may order the involuntary inactive enrollment of at attorney upon a finding that the attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to the interests of the attorney's clients or to the public. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6007, subd. (c)(1).)
The standard of proof is simple preponderance of evidence to establish past wrongdoing and, effectively, a beyond-reasonable-doubt standard for the attorney to rebut the presumption that wrongdoing will continue:
Where the evidence establishes a pattern of behavior, including acts likely to cause substantial harm, the burden of proof shall shift to the attorney to show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the harm will reoccur or continue. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6007, subd. (c)(2)(B).)
The State Bar allowed Gottschalk to practice until his year-later arrest, an outcome bespeaking the State Bar's incompetence or collusion.

Sunday, September 28, 2008

kanBARoo Court. Interlude 6. Making a federal case of it

My case, based on indisputable allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, proves due-process challenge strategies in disbarment cases shouldn't culminate in the California Supreme Court or below. My case tested and refuted the only theory on offer, alternative to bias, to explain the Supreme Court's post-1991 State Bar abstention. My theory said fundamental legal challenges seldom occurred in State Bar cases because the respondent's cost, incurred to avoid waiver — "involuntary enrollment inactive" — is too high.

I learn, as I get customers often owning greater working knowledge of the system than I, the causal picture is more complex. The determiner of State Bar Court decisions, when it wants to be, is the Board of Governors, the partly politically appointed, partly elected body that controls the State Bar. The incompetence of State Bar defense counsel also has an extra-legal complication, in a shadow organization of former State Bar trial counsel, an organization bestowed with a monopoly over striking deals, each sold at the going rate of a $50 thousand to $100 thousand in attorney's fee. These shadow-group State Bar defense attorneys, my sources tell me, compensate "referring" State Bar counsel with expensive gifts.

Despite the failure of a California Supreme Court strategy for fundamental legal attack, I remain convinced that only a fundamental attack can force dismissal in a disbarment case. The remaining realistic possibility for fundamental disbarment cases is attacking the U.S. Constitutional invalidity of parts of the State Bar Act in federal district court. A federal district court perspective depends on attributing statutory origin to one of the State Bar Court's systemic abuses. Informed customers say these abuses include, in addition to the State Bar's asserting monopoly power over defense counsel: pursuing charges the State Bar Investigator admits the State Bar knows are groundless; willfully withholding exculpatory evidence from in pro per respondents; and applying unlawful conditions, such as restricting potential counsel, to releasing exculpatory evidence. My case and experience adds others, such as deflecting or destroying court documents, proof of service fraud, and extortionate resignation demands.

My petition for rehearing offers no hope of resuscitating a California strategy. One reason, the petition's chances are slender at best. Why even slender? Because only the petition for rehearing contains a reply to a State Bar opposition. The State Bar troubled itself to avoid reply to its opposition to my petition for writ of review. Neither could I reply to the State Bar's opposition to my motion to strike, Rules of Court not permitting. When a court pays attention according to its preferences and acts according to its habits, a reply, as contained in my petition for rehearing, is the most important document. But if the Supreme Court were to grant my petition for rehearing, the court still had acted with such a degree of negligence that reliance on that court cannot ground a sound perspective. Reckless rubber-stamping seems the only explanation for apparent Supreme Court abstention, other than explaining it as invoking a surreptitious non-rebuttable presumption favoring the State Bar. My petition for rehearing in the California Supreme Court, consequently, doesn't even potentially rehabilitate the California high court as the target legal arbiter.

I am soliciting reports of State Bar prosecutorial misconduct, to help understand the State Bar's systemic due process violations. This information will help some of my customers and potentially an unknown number of California attorneys. Correspondents should feel free to e-mail reports anonymously.