Friday, July 4, 2008

kanBARoo Court. 40th Installment. Observations and Inferences

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While I prepare to file the petition for review to the California Supreme Court, here is a compendium of practical observations and inferences concerning the State Bar Court's functioning.

1. The State Bar's method is to make outrageous charges without evidence and then seek evidence through undisciplined discovery. (

2. The State Bar's incompetence grows from the absence of real controversies, that is to say, a dearth of seriously contested cases. (

3. Bar-Establishment oppression is defended ideologically by State-Bar-connected legal academics, whose incompetence in legal reasoning grows out of the State-Bar-enforcement culture. (

4. The Hearing Department judge plays the role of "good cop," so that even when the judge rules against the Office of Chief Trial Counsel, the court casts the onus against the respondent. (

5. The State Bar Court's Hearing Department and Review Department reside on adjacent floors and share their court clerks, a scenario bound to encourage ex parte communication. (

6. The unity of law/administration/entrepreneurship ensconced in a broadly interpreted anti-partnership law inescapably picks a particular template for the lawyer personality. (

7. The Office of the Chief Trial Attorney willfully misrepresents facts in signed legal documents. (

8. Because they lack the experience of seriously contested cases, State Bar trial counsel are apt to have astoundingly poor legal judgent. (

9. The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel constantly strives to take an improper default against respondents. (

10. Ex parte communication between the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel and the State Bar Hearing Department is a common occurrence. (

11. The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel will resort to actual fraud--destruction of documents--if challenged and angered. (

12. The law contains no specific constraints enforcing the neutrality of the State Bar Court from the Office of Chief Trial Counsel. (

13. The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has power to decide the cases it prosecutes, a power unequaled by any criminal prosecutor, by virtue of that office's judicial decision-making. (

14. If respondent proceeds based on a defective notice of disciplinary charges, any inculpating information gathered under that defective document’s banner retains its full force, regardless of the notice's fate. (

15. A strategic implication of the State Bar Court rules is that failing to assert crucial procedural rights, whenever tested, loses them. (

16. Granting parties their full right to self-representation, which includes the right to delegate its exercise, collaterally allows solving the problem of the oppressive and primitive State Bar rules, because 1) the Bar would no longer be charged with protecting the public, and 2) the Bar would no longer be empowered to regulate the practice of law. (

17. The State Bar is accustomed to malleable respondents expressing actual guilt or feigned remorse, and frustrating the State Bar's expectations provokes its wrath. (

18. The Office of the Chief Trial Counsel is irascible and easy to provoke, and respondents can exploit this propensity to irrationality. (

19. Because respondents seldom prevail at the State Bar Court, successful tactics in State Bar Court will look very different from successful tactics elsewhere in law. (

20. Inept lawyers look to the State Bar to insulate them from malpractice, because following the State Bar's lead demands less legal skill than analyzing a defrauded client's litigation options. (

21. "Cooperating" with the State Bar means admitting guilt, expressing remorse, and settling the case by stipulation. (

22. The State Bar Court's readiness to attach blame upon the Chief Trial Counsel's issuing charges stems from legal-ethical concepts holding attorneys culpable for the mere appearance of impropriety. (

23. The ease of adding new charges and the other procedures making undisciplined fishing expeditions threatening to justice demonstrate a public policy unworried about subjecting charged lawyers to these procedures. (

24. The appearance-of-impropriety rule serves as a misleading justification, hiding real significance, sometimes concealing important strengths, sometimes deficiencies. (

25. The California Supreme Court may tolerate the Bar's incompetence because under the prevailing concept of legal ethics, the appearance of impropriety constitutes an ethical infraction. (

26. No ethical infraction is incurred by deliberately provoking the State Bar while conducting a proper defense. (

27. The Clinton disbarment was an example of a State Bar's overreaching, undermining the federal system's integrity by asserting authority over a sitting President. (

28. Documents filed with the California Supreme Court for State Bar Court review, even more than legal documents in general, must contain language crafted to persuade, undaunting in mass, ultra-clear in exposition. (

29. The California Supreme Court avoids State Bar cases in part because nobody enjoys dealing with State Bar trial counsel, arrogant and incompetent, their work product unintelligible. (

30. The State Bar Court cannot legally infer lack of remorse from respondent's denial of the charges, although it will try to. (

31. The State Bar Court is prone to intentional misstatement of a respondent's position. (

32. The source of California's backwardness regarding capital punishment may be the same as that of its uniquely uncontrolled State Bar Court system, and the reasons Bar cases overloaded the California Supreme Court may explain its capital-case overload, both problems arising from moralistic excess. (

33. The State Bar Court will try to exploit its proprietary doctrine of strict ethical liability, despite legal untenability. (

34. The State Bar's burueacratic reflexiveness expresses and enshrines a regime of moralistic excess. (

35. The inception of a State Bar case often includes extortionate demands by an Investigator that respondent resign from the State Bar. (

36. The State Bar unilaterally manipulates delay to its advantage, while endlessly accusing respondent of the same conduct. (

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